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COMMENTS
Banks and Banking-Liability of Bank to Payee
for Cashing Check With Unauthorizd Endorsement
-Effect of Signature Cards*
The general rule is that a bank which cashes a check on a forged
or unauthorized endorsement is liable to the payee for the amount
of the check in the absence of negligence, latches, or estoppel by the
payee.' Recovery has been allowed on several different theories.
The two most widely used theories of recovery are actions for
money had and received 2 and conversion.3 A recent New Hampshire
case allowed recovery after the court found that the bank was negligent in cashing a check with an unauthorized endorsement.4 Both
Professors Scott' and Britton6 cite cases authorizing recovery on
the theory of participation in a breach of trust.
In the recent New Mexico case of Jomack Lumber Co. v. Grants
State Bank,7 the plaintiff, a corporate depositor, had filed a signature card with the defendant bank that stated:
Grants State Bank . . . is hereby authorized to recognize the signatures given below in payment of funds or transactions of other

business for this account-Two signatures required. 8

This was followed by the names and signatures of four individuals
including Burton and Lockwood.
0 Jomack Lumber Co. v. Grants State Bank, 75 N.M. 787, 411 P.2d 759 (1966).
1. Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 670 (1962), and cases cited therein. Estoppel arises when
the principal holds an agent out as having authority to endorse checks in the principal's name even though the agent has no authority. For a complete discussion of the
doctrine of estoppel as it applies to unauthorized endorsements, see Comment, 6 Natural
Resources J. 142 (1966).
2. See, e.g., Schaap v. State Nat'l Bank, 137 Ark. 251, 208 S.W. 309 (1918) ; Buena
Vista Oil Co. v. Park Bank, 39 Cal. App. 710, 180 Pac. 12 (Dist. Ct. App. 1919) ; E.
Moch Co. v. Security Bank, 176 App. Div. 842, 122 N.E. 879, 163 N.Y.S. 277 (1919).
3. See, e.g., Standard Steam Specialty Co. v. Corn Exch. Bank, 220 N.Y. 478, 116
N.E. 386 (1917) ; Gresham State Bank v. 0 & K Constr. Co., 231 Ore. 106, 370 P.2d
726 (1962). See also, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5OA-3-419 for the Uniform Commercial Code's
position on conversion of a negotiable instrument.
4. Security Fence Co. v. Manchester Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 101 N.H. 190, 136
A.2d 910 (1957).
5. Scott, Trusts § 324.3 (2d ed. 1956).
6. Britton, Bills & Notes § 118 (2d ed. 1961).
7. 75 N.M. 787, 411 P.2d 759 (1966).
8. Id. at 788, 411 P.2d at 760.
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Six checks were delivered to the bank by Burton over a period of
about one and one-half years.' These checks were either endorsed
restrictively or were endorsed with only one signature. Disregarding the restrictive or unauthorized endorsements, the bank cashed
these checks and gave the money to Burton who deposited part of
the money to the corporation's checking account as a cash deposit
and returned the remainder to the company cash drawer. It was
subsequently determined that this cash enabled an unknown embezzler to cover shortages in the cash drawer and in the cash deposits
to the company's bank account.10
The action in Jomack was on the theory of conversion. The
plaintiff alleged the delivery of the checks in question and the bank's
refusal to credit the amount of the checks to the plaintiff's account."
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence the trial court sustained
9. There might be a question of estoppel in this case. At the beginning of the
opinion the court said:
About June, 1961, Marion Mead and Louis Rice, plaintiff's accountant, became suspicious of shortages in the accounts but did nothing beyond discussing
the same with Frances Burton. They made no inquiry concerning the practice
of cashing checks, and did not ask defendant [Grants State Bank] to discontinue the practice.
Jomack Lumber Co. v. Grants State Bank, 75 N.M. 787, 789, 411 P.2d 759, 760. It seems
that the court is basing this conclusion on the testimony of the plaintiff's accountant.
His testimony indicates only that there was some concern over certain accounts being
delinquent. Records, pp. 112-23. These accounts were never more than 120 days delinquent because checks intended to pay for February purchases, for example, were being
applied to December or January purchases. When the employees were questioned about
the apparently delinquent accounts, "they said they were having difficulty in getting
their vouchers approved or purchase orders approved . . . which was delaying payment on those invoices." Record, p. 119. Mead and the accountant accepted this statement and did not inquire further. There is no evidence that the plaintiff ever became
aware of the bank's practice of cashing checks until the shortages were discovered. Because of the testimony, it seems that the court's statement is not quite accurate. Even if
the court's statement were accurate, however, the question of estoppel was never presented to the court. Estoppel was not raised as a defense in the defendant's answer nor
was it clearly discussed in the defendant-appellee's brief.
10. It should be noted that the plaintiff's loss might have occurred in the same way
even if the bank had required the requisite two signatures. Burton and Lockwood were
both authorized to transact businss on the company's account. Lockwood was the office
manager and Burton was his secretary. According to the testimony in the case, Lockwood set aside the checks which were to be cashed and Burton took them to the bank.
Record, pp. 88-110. It seems that if the bank had required two signatures, Lockwood
could have endorsed the checks and then directed Burton to do likewise with the same
result.
11. Record, p. 4. The plaintiff also alleged that the signature card constituted a
contract between the plaintiff and the bank and that when the bank cashed checks
with only one endorsement or a pro forma endorsement, the bank breached the contract. The findings of the trial court do not indicate that the decision was based on
this theory. Ibid.
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the defendant's motion for a directed verdict upon a finding that
there was no loss. On the plaintiff's appeal to the New Mexico
Supreme Court, held, Affirmed.
The elements of the tort of conversion include possession of another's goods, a demand that the goods be returned, and the refusal
to surrender them. 12 In Jornack, the bank alleged, and the court
found, that there was no refusal to surrender the proceeds of the
checks. "[P]laintiff received from the defendant every penny to
which it was entitled and any loss suffered by it resulted from the
intervening misconduct of someone else."'" While the soundness of
this position may be arguable even from the viewpoint of an action
for conversion, the purpose of this Comment is to explore the possible result had the corporate depositor brought the action as one
for negligence or participation in a breach of trust rather than as
one for conversion.
An action for negligence would present three questions: (1)
what is the duty of the bank regarding the encashment of checks
payable to a corporation; (2) what effect will a signature card have
on the performance of this duty; and (3) is the bank's negligence
in cashing checks with an unauthorized endorsement the cause of
the payee's loss resulting from a subsequent misuse of the funds? 4
The bank's duty to use care in cashing a check is clear from the
court's language in Saf-T-Boom Corp. v. Union Nat'l Bank. 5
"When a check is offered to a bank the obligation is upon the bank
12. Prosser, Torts § 15, at 90 (3d ed. 1964). This is a simplification of the elements
of the tort of conversion. Dean Prosser says that this is a highly technical area that
"almost defies definition." Id. at 79. Demand and refusal are not always necessary
elements, nor is the intent to affect the chattel of another "necessarily a matter of
conscious wrongdoing." Id. at 83.
13. 75 N.M. at 791, 411 P.2d at 762.
14. The term "misuse" includes situations like that in Jomack where the employee
does not embezzle the particular dollars received from the bank but delivers those
dollars to the employer, not for the use and benefit of the employer, but for the employee's use and benefit.
15. 367 S.W.2d 116 (Ark. 1963). In this case a check named the plaintiff corporation as payee. An employee of a separate subsidiary corporation using the same office as the plaintiff received, endorsed, and cashed the check. There was no doubt
that the employee had no authority to endorse the check. The plaintiff had on file with
the bank a signature card authorizing recognition of two signatures. The employee
was not named on the card. When the action was brought against the bank which
cashed the check, the bank defended on the grounds that the check was erroneously
made payable to the plaintiff and should have been made payable to the subsidiary
corporation; for this reason the plaintiff was not a holder for value and could not
bring the action. The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that this made no difference and
that the plaintiff was still entitled to the proceeds as the named payee.
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to determine if the endorsement is genuine and made by the payee
or one duly authorized by the payee." 6 Where a corporation is the
named payee, the proposition that "any person taking checks made
payable to a corporation, which can act only by agents, does so at
his peril and must abide by the consequences if the agent who endorses the same is without authority .... "I has been reiterated
several times.'
The bank's duty to use care in cashing checks naming its corporate
depositor as payee was taken for granted in Jomack because the
court said:
If Frances Burton had pocketed the cash received by her from the
bank, the authorities would seem clearly to support a conclusion that
the owner and payee of the checks could recover from the bank that
cashed them for her with unauthorized or altered endorsements.' 9
Thus, it appears that a bank has a duty to use due care in cashing
16. Id. at 119.
17. Standard Steam Specialty Co. v. Corn Exch. Bank, 220 N.Y. 478, 116 N.E. 386,
387 (1918). In this case checks payable to the corporate plaintiff were endorsed by an
unauthorized employee. These checks were cashed for the employee by various businessmen who eventually delivered the checks to the defendant bank and deposited the
proceeds to their accounts. The court said that "the good faith of the defendant [bank]
and its depositors is conceded . . . ." 116 N.E. at 386. The bank was held liable to the
payee for the proceeds of the checks even though there would have been no practical
way for the bank to determine whether the first endorsement was genuine. The
court's reasoning was that an unauthorized endorsement cannot pass title. This seems
to be a holding of strict liability and it is suggested that it is precisely this type of
strict liability that the court in Jomack was seeking to avoid.
An earlier New Mexico case, Morgan v. First Nat'l Bank, 58 N.M. 730, 276 P.2d
504 (1954), which was cited in Jomack, does impose strict liability with regard to
forged checks. The plaintiff wrote a check for $16,117 naming E. H. Martin & Co. as
payee. The money was to be used to purchase stock and the check bore a notation to
that effect. This check was delivered to the payee and was either lost or destroyed.
Martin forged a new check for the same amount payable to himself. He then cashed
the check at the defendant bank. When Martin failed to deliver the stock, the plaintiff
-the original drawer-sued the bank for cashing the forged check. The bank defended
on the grounds that the plaintiff drawer lost nothing because the bank delivered the
funds which the drawer intended to be delivered. The court held the bank liable saying that the secret intention of the drawer did not matter but that the payment was
made on a forged instrument which could not manifest the intention of the drawer.
There was no way for the bank in Morgan to check the authenticity of the instrument.
Even if the bank had contacted the drawer, the bank would have been informed that
the drawer had written a check payable to E. H. Martin & Co. in the amount of
$16,117. This decision imposed strict liability on the bank and could have influenced
the decision in Jomack.
18. See e.g., Campbell Trucking Corp. v. Public Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 105
N.Y.S.2d 870, 873 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
19. 75 N.M. at 790, 411 P.2d at 761.
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checks made to a corporate payee. The question remains, however,
what constitutes due care. Is merely cashing a check on an unauthorized endorsement negligence ?
The question of the bank's negligence in cashing a check endorsed
by an unauthorized agent has been considered in at least two cases. 221°
In Security Fence Co. v. Manchester Fed. Say. & Loan .4ss'n,
the plaintiff-in-interest was a surety company subrogated to the
rights of the plaintiff arising from a payment to the plaintiff because of a defalcation by the plaintiff's manager. The manager,
without authority to do so, had endorsed a check payable to the
plaintiff and collected the proceeds from the defendant bank. He
returned the proceeds to the plaintiff's petty cash drawer and subsequently spent the money entertaining himself and company customers. In ruling specifically on the question of negligence, the New
Hampshire court found that the bank had been negligent in failing
to ascertain whether or not the manager had the authority to en22
dorse the check.
In Security Fence23 the plaintiff was not a depositor so there
was no signature card appraising the bank of persons authorized
to transact business on the part of the company. If the bank is
negligent in cashing a check under these circumstances, a fortiori
the bank is negligent in cashing a check for an employee whom the
bank knows is not authorized to cash checks because he is not
named on the signature card. 4 Thus, it is meaningful to focus on
the purpose of the signature card and its possible effect on the
bank's liability in an action for negligence.
That the execution of a signature card imposes a limitation on the
manner in which a bank may handle the depositor's account, is apparent in most instances from the wording of the instrument itself.
The precise nature of this limitation presents a more difficult ques20. Security Fence Co. v. Manchester Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 101 N.H. 190, 136
A.2d 910 (1957), and Industrial Plumbing & Heating Supply Co. v. Carter County
Bank, 25 Tenn. App. 168, 154 S.W.2d 432 (1941).
21. 101 N.H. 190, 136 A.2d 910 (1957).

22. The issue of negligence was squarely presented because the surety company, as
one subrogated to the rights of another, could not recover unless there was a finding
of negligence.
23.

101 N.H. 190, 136 A.2d 910 (1957).

This case was cited in the appellant's

brief in Jomack on the question of damages. Brief for the Appellant, p. 105. Despite the
fact that the case is directly in point, the court seems to have overlooked it entirely.
24. In Jomack, Burton was one of the persons named on the signature card as authorized to transact business for the company. The signature card required two signatures for the transaction of business; each of the checks in question bore either a pro
forma endorsement or only one signature.
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tion. Does the signature card limit the manner in which transactions
can be conducted to a signature by an authorized person on every
instrument, or does it limit only the persons authorized to transact
business? The failure to distinguish between these two questions
led the New Mexico Supreme Court into the anomalous position of
denying any effect to a signature card. 25 In Cooper v. Albuquerque
Nat'l Bank,2" directors of a trust fund executed a signature card
naming certain persons and requiring two signatures for the transaction of business. All the checks involved in the suit were payable to
the trust but were endorsed with only one signature and deposited to
the account of the association responsible for the trust. In discussing
the effect of the signature card, the court said:
Appellees cite no direct authority to support their statement that

the signature cards revoked or superseded the authority previously
given to Peke to deposit checks made out to the Trust Fund to the
Association's account. In the absence of any authority to support

this contention . . . we are of the opinion that Peke had the necessary authority . . . 27
to deposit Trust Fund checks directly to the
Association's account.
The court then cited Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. Palmetto Bank 28 as
authority for the proposition that the "signature card is executed
for the benefit of the bank" for the purpose of helping the bank
to detect forgeries and to identify the persons authorized to transact business on the account.29 However, in Glens Falls the court was
only answering the question on whether the signature card limits
the manner of transacting business to signatures on the checks. The
Glens Falls case answered negatively saying:
I do not construe the signature card to mean that no business could
be transacted with the bank without the signature of either Link or
Henry. If this were true no money could have been deposited in the
bank unless some instrument were signed by one or the other. If
Link received a .check payable to Watts Mills and deposited this

check, this would constitute a transaction of business on the mill's
25.
26.
27.
28.

See Comment, 6 Natural Resources J. 142 (1966).
75 N.M. 295, 404 P.2d 125 (1965).
Cooper v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, 75 N.M. 295, 303, 404 P.2d 125, 131 (1965).
23 F. Supp. 844- (W.D.S.C. 1938), aff'd, 104 F.2d 671 (4th Cir. 1939).

29. Id. at 849. Even if this were the position generally adopted by the courts
regarding the purpose of a signature card, it would appear that the only reason that
the bank needs to detect forgeries and identify persons authorized to transact business
on the account is because the bank has a duty to the depositor to do so.
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account with the bank. He could have done this without signing
anything.8 0

The reasoning of the Glens Falls court on this issue is persuasive.
But the proposition that the signature card does not limit the authority of the named persons to conducting certain transactions on
their signature only, should not be the basis for saying that it does
not limit the persons who are to transact business on the account.
It must be noted that the court in Jomack seems to have retreated
from the position taken in Cooper regarding the purpose and

effect of signature cards. The Jomack court concluded that the
bank had acted wrongfully and that the bank would be liable to
the payee if the employee had pocketed the money."' Jomack seems
to be following the better view of the purpose of a signature card
enunciated in Industrial Plumbing & Heating Supply Co. v. Carter
County Bank. 2 In that case the signature card authorized only one
employee to transact business on the company account. An employee

not named on the signature card delivered a check with a pro
forma endorsement to the defendant bank and received the cash
proceeds. In discussing the purpose of a signature card the court
said:
The card was executed conferring authority to protect the bank and
the customer in all transactions requiring the signature of an agent in
the transaction of business. It is as important to the bank to protect
itself against the unauthorized signature of an agent in the endorsement of a check as in the drawing of a check, and the purpose was
to protect both the bank and the depositor in every transaction
between them requiring an agent's signature.8 3
Earlier in the opinion the court had stated that:
The card did not afford protection to the bank alone, and give no
protection to the customer. The customer had a right to rely upon
the bank's following and carrying out the instructions given upon
the card which it had required. The bank was not justified in disregarding the express instructions contained upon the card and acting
34
upon appearances.
30. Id. at 849.
31. See text accompanying note 19 .upra.
32. 25 Tenn. App. 168, 154 S.W.2d 432 (1941).
33. 154 S.W.2d at 435.
34.

Id.

at 434.
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Thus, the more correct viewpoint seems to be that the signature
card is executed for the purpose of protecting the depositor, as
well as the bank, from defalcations by persons not authorized to
transact business on the depositor's account. When a bank ignores
or fails to use this information and pays out corporate funds either
already in the account or by cashing a check payable to the corporation on an unauthorized endorsement, the bank is prima facie
negligent, as the court in Indrustrial Plumbing held. "The bank
was negligent in not ascertaining the agent's authority to endorse
the check, the evidence of authority was available in the bank's
records . . . .
In Jomack the central issue was the matter of causation. The
New Mexico court recognized that the bank had committed a
wrong in cashing the improperly endorsed checks: "in the present
case, although there was a wrong, there was no damage as a result
thereof . . . ."" The court's difficulty was with the problem of
whether the bank's wrong was the cause of the plaintiff's injury. It
is likely that this difficulty was present because the suit was an
action for conversion. The plaintiff had alleged that it had delivered
the checks to the bank and that the bank had refused to credit the
account.3 7 The court was unable to find that the bank was still
holding funds belonging to the plaintiff when the proceeds from the
checks were either credited to the plaintiff's account or returned
to the cash drawer even though the deposit or return of these
funds was not for corporate purposes but for the embezzler's own
purpose, that is, to conceal the loss of money already misappropriated and to make possible further misappropriations.
If the action were based on the theory of negligence, however,
the bank's wrongful act would more easily be seen as the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. In an action for negligence, the
New Mexico test for causation is one of foreseeability: "The rule
is universal that the injury resulting from any act of negligence
must, however, have been such as a reasonably prudent person
should have anticipated." ' Although the court in Jomack held that
"any loss suffered by it [the plaintiff] resulted from the intervening
misconduct of someone else," 3 9 in Reif v. Morrison the supreme
court said:
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 435.
75 N.M. at 791, 411 P.2d at 762.
Record, p. 4.
Reif v. Morrison, 44 N.M. 201, 206, 100 P.2d 229, 232 (1940).
75 N.M. at 791, 411 P.2d at 762.
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If the occurrence of the intervening cause upon which defendant
would rely, might reasonably have been anticipated, such intervening
cause will not40interrupt the connection between the original cause
and the injury.
That a bank can reasonably be expected to foresee the subsequent
misuse of funds paid out on an unauthorized endorsement did not
present a difficult problem for the New York court in Campbell
Trucking Corp. v. Public Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.4 In that case
a corporate resolution was on file with the bank naming two officers
authorized to sign checks on the corporation's account. An employee not named in the resolution, but authorized to endorse
items for deposit with a rubber stamp-or upon its unavilability
by hand-presented a check to the bank which named the corporation as payee. The check had been endorsed with the corporate name
in blank but was not endorsed by any employee authorized to
withdraw corporate funds from the bank. The bank cashed the
check and delivered the funds to the employee. The New York
court held that:
The endorsement here in blank of the corporate name, without the
addition of the name of a corporate officer authorized to sign checks
or to endorse paper, as well as the absence of the superior employee's
endorsement was a clear indication that this check was not being
handled in regular fashion and to warn the bank that it was being
42
diverted.

This appears to be a sound approach, for what is an employee to
do with funds to which he is not entitled? An employee not authorized to handle corporate money is presumably not directed to use
it for corporate purposes. Without authorization to have corporate
funds, an employee can only be expected to use the funds for his
own purposes.
Applying this reasoning to Jomack, it would seem that the bank
should have been able to foresee that the funds received by an employee who cashed improperly endorsed checks might be misused in
some way; if the bank can reasonably be expected to foresee the injury to the payee, then its negligence is the cause of the payee's loss.
The decision in Security Fence4 s provides further support for this
40. 44 N.M. 201, 205, 100 P.2d 229, 231 (1940).

41. 105 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
42. Id. at 872. (Emphasis added.)
43. 101 N.H. 190, 136 A.2d 910 (1957). See text accompanying note 21 supra for
the facts of this case.
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reasoning. The New Hampshire court determined that the bank
was negligent in cashing the instrument and held that:
the payment of money order by the bank upon the unauthorized endorsement of the agent clearly furnished the opportunity for mis-

appropriation of the funds. Thus the bank may not reasonably be

relieved of responsibility upon the theory that its conduct was not
44
causal of the loss.
In Security Fence the employee placed the funds in the company's
petty cash box and later misused the same money. But in Jomack,
the funds received from the checks were not themselves embezzled,
instead they were used to conceal prior and subsequent defalcations.
The same rule should apply, however, because unless some funds
were available to enable the embezzler to balance the books, the
defalcations could not have continued. Moreover, the funds were
used, not for corporate purposes, but for the employee's own
purposes.
The decision in IndustrialPlumbing also supports the conclusion
that the bank's negligence in failing to follow the instructions on the
signature card is the proximate cause of the payee's loss. 5
When the agent withdrew and appropriated the money, the burden
was not upon the plaintiff to trace the money further and show by
the proof that the agent did not place the money in the register of

the company and then withdraw it. The bank in wrongfully cashing the check caused the loss. 4 6
Utilization of the negligence theory suggests an answer to the
hypothetical problem posed at the end of the opinion in Jomack.
The court suggested that if the bank were held to be the cause of
the loss under the facts of Jomack, the bank may be held liable as
the cause of the loss where the employee, after cashing checks on
an unauthorized endorsement, is held up by a robber and the money
received from cashing the check is stolen while the employee is on
the way back to the store. This result would not be likely in an
action for negligence because the robber is an independent intervening cause. While the bank may reasonably be expected to foresee
the possibility of the embezzlement of the money which it delivered
to an employee not authorized to receive it, it is difficult to foresee
44. 136 A.2d at 913.
45. 25 Tenn. App. 168, 154 S.W.2d 432 (1941).
supra for the facts of this case.
46. 154 S.W.2d at 435.

See text accompanying note 33
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the independent intentional tort of a third party not involved in the
transaction.
It was suggested earlier 7 that the court was reluctant to find
liability in Jomack because of its desire to prevent the extension of
bank liability for conversion in cases like Security Fence48 and Morgan4 where the bank has acted without fault. Use of negligence as
the basis of recovery requires proof of some degree of fault. To
impose liability on the bank under this theory would require: (1)
the bank's possession of a signature card, or other instrument, informing it of the persons to whom it may deliver the depositor's
money; (2) the bank's failure to use this information; and (3) the
loss of the payee being within the risk-that is, that the loss and
the manner in which it occurs be reasonably foreseeable. These requirements should obviate the court's fears of imposing strict liability on banks for cashing checks where there is no practical way of
determining the scope of the employee's authority.
Another theory for recovery suggested by Professors Scott50 and
Britton"' is that the bank is liable for participation in breach of
trust. This theory is applicable where "the bank holds fiduciary
funds on deposit known by the bank to be such, and permits the fiduciary to withdraw such funds ... "52 The issues in an action
brought under this theory are ( 1 ) whether the funds on deposit are
in fact fiduciary funds and (2) whether this fact is known to the
bank or is so clear from the circumstances that it should be known.
Section 33-1-1 of the New Mexico statutes53 defines a fiduciary
as any "partner, agent [or] officer of a corporation." It would
follow from this definition that the funds of a corporation which
can deal only through its agents are fiduciary funds, and knowledge
of the corporate character of the funds should impart knowledge of
their fiduciary character. However, since the New Mexico statute54
requires either the bank's bad faith or actual knowledge of the
agent's breach of trust to impose liability on the bank for participation, the central issue becomes what constitutes actual knowledge.
It will be recalled that courts have stated that the purpose of the
signature card is to inform the bank of persons authorized to trans47. See note 17 supra.
48. 101 N.H. 190, 136 A.2d 910 (1957).

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

58 N.M. 730, 276 P.2d 504 (1954). See note 17 supra for the facts of this case.
3 Scott, Trusts § 324.3 (2d ed. 1956).
Britton, Bills & Notes § 118 (2d ed. 1961).
Ibid.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-1-1 (1953).

54.

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-1-4 (1953).
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act business on the account." Thus, the bank has knowledge not
only of the persons with whom it may conduct business, but also of
the persons authorized to conduct business with the bank in the
name of the corporation. It would be incongruous for a corporation
to file a signature card restricting to certain named persons the
authority to transact corporate business in the account and then
give the authority to someone not named on the card and hope that
the bank would breach its duty and allow the employee not named
to transact corporate business. When an employee not empowered
by the signature card to transact corporate business attempts to
cash a check payable to the corporation, the presumption is that the
employee has in fact no power to do so and in attempting to cash
the check is breaching a trust. When the bank gives its assistance by
cashing the check, it must be held to have participated in the breach.
The teller who cashed most of the checks for Burton in Jomack
testified that she knew of the existence of the signature card and of
its contents and that she knew this at the time of cashing the checks
in question.5 As a result, the bank had actual knowledge that Burton was exceeding her authority in attempting to cash the checks
payable to the corporation. Such conduct must be deemed a participation in a breach of trust.
In assessing the wisdom of imposing liability on the banks, the
necessity of encouraging the free exchange of money must be
weighed against the corporation's need to be able to rely upon
banks following instructions in handling the corporation's account.
A corporation can only deal through agents, and to lessen the possibility of losses through defalcations by its employees, it must be
able to limit the number of persons empowered to handle its financial transactions, thereby enabling the corporation to fix the responsibility for losses on only a few persons. This limitation can
be effective only if the banks are encouraged to deliver corporate
funds to persons authorized to receive them. Nothing will provide
more effective encouragement for the banks to do this than imposing
liability on them for losses incurred as the result of their disregard
of the corporation's instructions on the signature card. Moreover,
if the banks are permitted to become lax in fulfilling these obligations, commercial intercourse would be impeded rather than fostered. Corporations, unable to rely upon the banks following their
instructions would be dissuaded from utilizing both banks and ne55. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
56. Record, p. 135.
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gotiable instruments to their fullest extent. The requirement that
the banks make use of their own records to determine the corporation's instructions and the imposition of liability for their failure
to do so would tend to promote rather than discourage the free
exchange of money.
There has been some indication that the banks in New Mexico
have tended to disregard signature cards executed by their depositors. The subtle change in the court's position on the purpose of
signature cards evidenced in Jomack should provide some warning
to banks that a practice of disregarding signature cards will not always be tolerated. 7 While in most cases the courts are reluctant to
impose liability for a practice previously tolerated, the New Mexico
court may do so in a well argued case.
An action based on either the theory of negligence or participation in breach of trust would seem to meet with greater success in
a case like Jomack because liability based on either theory is essentially a "fault" liability. The requirement of some degree of
culpability on the part of the bank would attenuate the court's fears
about extending the bank's liability for conversion which does not
necessarily involve "fault" of any degree. While it may be said
that it does not matter which theory is used because the forms of
action have been abolished, one noted commentator has made the
observation that:
Forms of action are dead, but their ghosts still haunt the precincts
of the law. In their life they were powers of evil, and even in death
they have not wholly ceased from troubling. In earlier days they
filled the law with formalism and fiction, confusion and complexity,
and though most of the mischief which they did has been buried with
them, some portion of it remains inherent in the law of the present
day.
In no branch of the law is this more obvious than in that which
relates to the different classes of wrongs which may be committed
with respect to chattels. In particular the law of trover and conversion is a region still darkened with the mists of legal formalism,
through which no man will find his way by the light of nature or
with any other guide save the old learning of writs and forms of
action and the mysteries of pleading. 58
JOHN
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57. See text accompanying notes 25-35 supra.
58. Salmond, Obrervations on Trover and Conversion, 21 L.Q. Rev. 43 (1905).

